2010年11月13日土曜日

Removing Belts at Airport Security

以下の文章は、 Schneier on Security に掲載された記事の日本語訳であり、著者の許可を得て公開するものである。 

TSA は私たちにベルトを外させるようだ。必要のない時でさえ


ヨーロッパの空港では乗客にベルトを外すよう長年も泊めている。私がいつもやる方法は、mまずシャツでベルトを上から隠すこと。その後一瞬シャツをまくり、ベルトはつけてない旨係官に言う。ベルトは金属探知機に反応しないから、彼らも気づかない。



 元記事:Posted on November 10, 2010 at 1:41 PM

2010年11月5日金曜日

Did the FBI Invent the D.C. Bomb Plot?

以下の文章は、 Schneier on Security に掲載された記事の日本語訳であり、著者の許可を得て公開するものである。 

先週警察はFaroque Ahmed を、ワシントンD.C 地下鉄網においてテロを計画した容疑により逮捕した。しかし計画自体は彼のアイデアがどれほどを占め、どれほどをFBIが有料で提供している情報が占めているかは不明瞭である。

The indictment offers some juicy tidbits -- Ahmed allegedly proposed using rolling suitcases instead of backpacks to bomb the Metro -- but it is notably thin in details about the role of the FBI. It is not clear, for example, whether Ahmed or the FBI (or some combination of the two) came up with the concept of bombing the Metro in the first place. And the indictment does not say when and why Ahmed first encountered the people he believed to be members of al-Qaida.

警察はこの偽爆破計画を、地下鉄での荷物抜打ち検査正当化の理由にしている。(まぬけなアイデアだ)

これが思想犯罪の場合の問題となる。簡単ににかかってしまう。


追記 (11/4): The Economist ブログに同じようなことが書いてあった。




 元記事:Posted on September 6, 2010 at 7:24 AM

Control Fraud

以下の文章は、 Schneier on Security に掲載された記事の日本語訳であり、著者の許可を得て公開するものである。 

"control fraud (操作詐欺)" という言葉は聞いた事がなかった:


Control fraud theory was developed in the savings and loan debacle. It explained that the person controlling the S&L (typically the CEO) posed a unique risk because he could use it as a weapon.



The theory synthesized criminology (Wheeler and Rothman 1982), economics (Akerlof 1970), accounting, law, finance, and political science. It explained how a CEO optimized "his" S&L as a weapon to loot creditors and shareholders. The weapon of choice was accounting fraud. The company is the perpetrator and a victim. Control frauds are optimal looters because the CEO has four unique advantages. He uses his ability to hire and fire to suborn internal and external controls and make them allies. Control frauds consistently get "clean" opinions for financial statements that show record profitability when the company is insolvent and unprofitable. CEOs choose top-tier auditors. Their reputation helps deceive creditors and shareholders.
Only the CEO can optimize the company for fraud.


これは control fraud に関する興味深いレポートだ。Institute for Fraud Prevention エグゼクティブディレクターWillam K. Black によって書かれている。"個々による'control frauds'は、他の形態のプロパティ犯罪を全て合わせたものよりさらに多くの損失を生じる。これらは財政上多大なダメージを生む原因となる (financial super-predetors)。 " Black は組織の首脳部及び週首脳部両方について書いており、またその言説はほぼ確実に真実だ。彼の要点はつまり、私たちの法律制度は control fraud を留まらせるには不十分である、ということだ。



White-collar criminology has a set of empirical findings and theories that are useful to understanding when markets will act perversely. This paper addresses three, interrelated theories economists should know about. "Control fraud" theory explains why the most damaging forms of fraud are situations in which those that control the company or the nation use it as a fraud vehicle. The CEO, or the head of state, poses the greatest fraud risk. A single large control fraud can cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime combined they are the "super-predators" of the financial world. Control frauds can also occur in waves that can cause systemic economic injury and discredit other institutions essential to good government and society. Control frauds are commonly able to defeat for several years market mechanisms that neo-classical economists predict will prevent such frauds.



"Systems capacity" theory examines why under deterrence is so common. It shows that, particularly with respect to elite crimes, anti-fraud resources and willpower are commonly so limited that "crime pays." When systems capacity limitations are severe a "criminogenic environment" arises and crime increases. When a criminogenic environment for control fraud occurs it can produce a wave of control fraud.
"Neutralization" theory explores how criminals neutralize moral and social barriers that reduce crime by constraining our decision-making to honest enterprises. The easier individuals are able to neutralize such social restraints, the greater the incidence of crime.
[...]
White-collar criminology findings falsify several neo-classical economic theories. This paper discusses the predictive failures of the efficient markets hypothesis, the efficient contracts hypothesis and the law & economics theory of corporate law. The paper argues that neo-classical economists' reliance on these flawed models leads them to recommend policies that optimize a criminogenic environment for control fraud. Fortunately, these policies are not routinely adopted in full. When they are, they produce recurrent crises because they eviscerate the institutions and mores vital to make markets and governments more efficient in preventing waves of control fraud. Criminological theories have demonstrated superior predictive and explanatory behavior with regard to perverse economic behavior. This paper discusses two realms of perverse behavior the role of waves of control fraud in producing economic crises and the role that endemic control fraud plays in producing economic stagnation.

 元記事:Posted on November 1, 2010 at 6:02 AM